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Few innovations in environmental policy
have proliferated as quickly and widely as the
precautionary principle (PP). Based on the
maxim “better safe than sorry,” the PP seeks
to formalize the application of precaution to
regulatory decision making, even though no
standard deﬁnition or wording of the princi-
ple has yet to emerge. Notwithstanding the
lack of a deﬁnitive formulation, the PP in just
the past decade has been included in over a
dozen international environmental agree-
ments, expressly incorporated into the legal
framework of the European Union (EU), and
adopted into the domestic laws of numerous
nations. By any measure, this is an impressive
record of success, and one that demonstrates
that the PP is fulfilling a previously unmet
need in environmental policy.
Notwithstanding its meteoric spread, the
PP may be reaching its limitations, at least in its
current form. The PP began as a general aspira-
tional policy but in recent years has steadily
been transformed into an obligatory legal
requirement. It is in this latter context that the
shortcomings of the PP become apparent.
Speciﬁcally, the PP as currently cast fails to pro-
vide a workable guide to the application of pre-
caution in speciﬁc regulatory decisions. 
Need for Precaution
Precaution has always had an essential role in
regulating environmental risks. Every risk
involves some uncertainties, which must be
bridged by precaution in making any decision
to reduce risk. In other words, few if any
regulatory decisions could be taken in the
absence of some precaution. The United
States and European nations have applied
some degree of precaution in making health
and environmental decisions for many years
(Applegate 2000; Boehmer-Christiansen
1994; Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency 1976). In the past, how-
ever, the application of precaution has often
been implicit, whereas the PP makes the role
of precaution explicit. By formalizing and
bringing precaution to the forefront, the PP
has the potential to make environmental deci-
sion making more deliberative, transparent,
and coherent.
Yet, proponents of the PP do not seek
merely to make the application of precaution
more explicit. They also seek to apply more
precaution than has been applied in the past.
For example, a group of leading PP supporters
gathered in January 1998 at the Wingspread
Conference Center in Wisconsin and issued
the Wingspread Statement, which states that
“existing environmental regulations and
other decisions, particularly those based on
risk assessment, have failed to protect ade-
quately human health and the environment”
(Raffensperger and Tickner 1999).
Many examples can be cited of risks that
were initially ignored or underestimated but
that later turned out to be highly damaging.
Examples include asbestos, leaded gasoline,
mad cow disease, chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES),
and methyl tertiary butyl ether in gasoline
(Harremoës et al. 2002). Of course, other
examples could also be cited where, in retro-
spect, perhaps too much precaution was
applied to what turned out to be insigniﬁcant
or nonexistent risks. Examples of excessive
precaution might include saccharin, silicone
breast implants, Bendectin, “ice minus” bac-
teria, the MMR (measles, mumps, and
rubella) vaccine, swine ﬂu, genetically modi-
ﬁed (GM) Bacillus thuringiensis corn and the
monarch butterﬂy, and the risk of pancreatic
cancer from coffee consumption.
At least four observations can be made
about these dueling laundry lists of past
examples showing too little or too much pre-
caution. First, there will always be a trade-off
between overregulation (false positives) and
underregulation (false negatives) in ex ante
regulation of uncertain risks (Stewart 2002;
Wiener and Rogers 2002). The total number
of false positives and false negatives can be
reduced, although never eliminated, through
the development of more accurate risk assess-
ment methods and data. The relative balance
between false positives and false negatives can
also be shifted by applying more or less pre-
caution but only at the cost of increasing one
type of error by reducing the other. The more
precaution that is applied, the more false
negatives we will have avoided, but also the
more often it will turn out that we have acted
excessively (i.e., false positives) (Goldstein
1999). It should come as no surprise, there-
fore, that some examples of overregulation
and underregulation can be identified after
the fact, as there will always be some of both
error types. The critical inquiry is whether the
optimal balance between false positives and
false negatives has been struck, a question
that is difficult to examine empirically and
likely to be highly contested.
A second preliminary observation is that
many of the risks now cited as exemplars
showing the need for greater precaution were
not, and perhaps could not have been, foreseen
at the time of initial product deployment. For
example, the potential of asbestos to cause
mesothelioma, CFCs to deplete stratospheric
ozone, and DES to cause adenocarcinomas
could not have been reasonably anticipated at
the times those products were initially devel-
oped. To be sure, a strong case can be made
that industry and government regulators
moved too slowly in preventing additional
harm once the evidence of such adverse effects
was available, or that imposing stronger pre-
market testing requirements on product manu-
facturers may have permitted earlier detection
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problem was ignorance rather than uncertainty
about risks that were outside the scope of fore-
seeable effects (Bodansky 1991; Hoffmann-
Riem and Wynne 2002). It is difﬁcult to see
how the PP can help address risks for which we
are ignorant rather than uncertain. As stated by
Dovers and Handmer (1995), “[w]e cannot
prevent the unanticipated: the PP still leaves us
bound by present knowledge.” 
A third observation is that any attempt to
compare the number of historical false posi-
tives versus false negatives will be hampered by
the asymmetry in verifying the two types of
errors. It is easier to prove the existence of risk
than the absence of risk (Hansson 1997).
There is no serious doubt, for example, that
asbestos causes mesothelioma or that DES
caused adenocarcinomas, whereas any conclu-
sion that a particular agent presents no signiﬁ-
cant risk is necessarily more tentative and
qualified. For example, a new study could
show tomorrow that the MMR vaccine does
indeed cause autism, even though the data
available to date indicate there is no such asso-
ciation (Madsen et al. 2002). In contrast, it is
inconceivable that a new study could demon-
strate, for instance, that asbestos does not
cause mesothelioma. Thus, examples of false
positives are likely to be more provisional (and
perhaps then undercounted) than examples of
false negatives.
Finally, although the false negatives may
be easier to detect, they also generally involve
more serious consequences than the false
positives (Page 1978). The societal costs of
unnecessary carcinogenicity warnings for sac-
charin or forcing apparently safe products
such as silicone breast implants or Bendectin
off the market may be substantial but pale in
comparison to the consequences of many false
negatives such as asbestos or mad cow disease.
This asymmetry may not apply in all cases,
such as when overly stringent regulation of
one set of health risks may increase overall risk
as a result of risk–risk trade-offs (Cross 1996;
Graham and Wiener 1995). Other cases, how-
ever, will often involve balancing the health
effects from potential underregulation (false
negatives) versus the economic costs of poten-
tial overregulation (false positives). Our strong
(although not inﬁnite) preference for lives over
dollars provides much of the justiﬁcation for
the PP (Geistfeld 2001).
Inherent Ambiguity of the
Precautionary Principle
The PP is based on the common-sense adage
that it is better to be safe than sorry. There is,
however, no standard text for the PP. Each
formulation of the PP shares the common
prescription that scientific certainty is not
required before taking preventive measures.
In addition, most versions of the PP involve
some degree of burden shifting to the propo-
nent of an activity or product to demonstrate
the safety of its product. The many different
versions of the PP have a common short-
coming, however, in that they fail to answer
the critical question of how much precaution
to apply in a given circumstance (Bodansky
1991; Marchant 2002). 
Consider first the important differences
between different versions of the PP. Sandin
(1999) identiﬁed 19 different formulations of
the PP that differ across four dimensions he
described as threat, uncertainty, action, and
command. Different versions of the PP vary,
for example, in the level of the threat necessary
to trigger the principle from “threats of serious
or irreversible damage” to “possible risks,” a
discrepancy of enormous policy importance.
While some of the variations between differ-
ent formulations of the principle are mostly
semantic, other differences go to the core of
the meaning and application of precaution. 
Consider the important differences
between two well-known formulations of the
PP. The Rio Declaration produced by the
1992 United Nations Second Special Session
on Environment and Development (United
Nations Conference on Environment and
Development 1992) endorsed the following
PP formulation:
When there are threats of serious and irreversible
damage, lack of full scientiﬁc certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
The Wingspread Statement (1998)
prepared by PP proponents deﬁned the PP as
follows:
When an activity raises threats of harms to human
health or the environment, precautionary meas-
ures should be taken even if some cause and effect
relationships are not fully established scientiﬁcally. 
These two PP formulations have critical
discrepancies. The Rio Declaration applies
only to “serious and reversible risks,” whereas
the Wingspread Statement presumably
applies to any risk. The Rio Declaration
applies by its terms only to actions that would
result in environmental degradation, whereas
the Wingspread Statement is broader, apply-
ing to actions that would harm either the
environment or human health. The Rio
Declaration indicates that any regulatory
actions undertaken should be cost effective,
whereas the Wingspread Statement gives no
consideration to costs. The Rio Declaration
imposes no affirmative duty to act, but the
Wingspread version is phrased in terms of a
positive obligation to act. The combined
effect of these differences could easily result in
inconsistent regulatory outcomes in many
cases. Given these and other important differ-
ences between various formulations of the PP,
it seems inappropriate to refer to “the” PP in
the singular (Stone 2001).
In addition to the variations between PP
formulations, any single formulation of the
principle fails to specify an adequate decision-
making rule. The EU has gone furthest in
articulating the meaning of the PP in a
29-page communication issued in February
2000 (European Commission 2000),
although neither that communication nor the
legislation adopting the PP into the Treaty of
Europe provides an actual definition of the
PP. The communication makes some
progress in clarifying the PP by, for example,
specifying that the PP applies only to risk
management and not risk assessment and is
triggered only by risks identiﬁed by scientiﬁc
risk assessment. Moreover, according to the
communication, the PP incorporates the
principle of proportionality, and “should
include an economic cost-benefit analysis
where this is appropriate and possible.” 
Many PP proponents criticized the EU’s
communication, especially its incorporation
of cost-benefit analysis and scientific risk
assessment. Many PP proponents reject the
incorporation of economic considerations or
risk assessment into the PP (Barrett and
Raffensperger 2002; Santillo et al. 1998). This
disagreement between the EU, the strongest
governmental proponent of the PP, and many
leading nongovernmental PP supporters fur-
ther conﬁrms the unsettled meaning of the PP.
More important, notwithstanding
the impressive effort by the European
Commission, its 29-page exposition of the PP
still leaves many key questions about the
meaning and application of the PP un-
answered. For example, the communication
fails to clearly articulate the factors that will
determine when the PP applies and when it
does not. At one point, the communication
states that the PP only applies when it is
“impossible to determine with sufﬁcient cer-
tainty the risk in question” (European
Commission 2000). But given that every risk
involves some uncertainty, it is not clear when
risk is “sufﬁciently” uncertain to justify appli-
cation of the PP. The communication also
states that a political decision is necessary to
determine when a risk is “acceptable” but
gives little guidance on how such acceptability
determinations are to be made. Although the
communication emphasizes the need to avoid
misuse of the PP for arbitrary or protectionist
purposes, it is not apparent how this will be
accomplished, given the continuing vagueness
of the PP. The U.S. government criticized the
communication for, among other things,
failing to ensure that the PP will not be
applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory fash-
ion, given that “a clear deﬁnition has not been
provided and . . . political decisions will deter-
mine its use” (U.S. FDA/USDA 2000).
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also fail to articulate when the proponent of a
technology has met the burden of proof that
is shifted to the proponent under most ver-
sions of the PP. Given the logical impossibil-
ity of proving a negative, along with the
reality that nothing in this world presents zero
risk, the PP surely cannot require a technol-
ogy proponent to prove that its product has
zero risk (Bodansky 1994). As the EU’s com-
munication states, “[m]easures based on the
precautionary principle must not . . . aim at
zero risk, something which rarely exists”
(European Commission 2000). Other leading
proponents of the PP likewise acknowledge
that “we can never know with certainty
whether a particular activity will cause harm”
(Raffensperger and Tickner 1999). Given
these realities, the burden of proof shifted to a
product manufacturer under the PP must
have some practical limitations, yet none are
provided by any version of the PP. 
The PP not only lacks any clear guidance
on when and how it does apply but perhaps
more importantly is devoid of any limitations
of when it does not apply (Mossman and
Marchant 2002). Without such limitations,
the PP will be a vacuum that can consume
any and all products and technologies, as
some risk and uncertainty is associated with
every human activity. Until PP proponents
provide some clear, principled criteria for
when the PP applies and when it does not,
the PP will remain ill deﬁned and subject to
ad hoc advocacy and decision making. 
Invitation for Arbitrariness
The ambiguity of the PP invites arbitrary
application, both with respect to which risks
it is applied to and what it requires when it
does apply (Bodansky 1991; Marchant 2002).
To be sure, the PP is not the only environ-
mental policy instrument that has some ambi-
guity. Cost–beneﬁt analysis, for example, has
many potential ambiguities such as whether
and how to quantify and monetize various
benefits and costs, how to address benefits
that cannot be quantified, whether and how
to discount future costs and beneﬁts, and how
costbeneﬁt analysis should be used in making
a regulatory decision. Whenever costbenefit
analysis is undertaken, however, these ambi-
guities have to be addressed, as it is not possi-
ble to conduct a costbeneﬁt analysis without
resolving those questions. 
That is not the case with the PP. There is
now a data set of hundreds of regulatory and
judicial decisions in Europe and elsewhere
that rely on the PP. Very few of these
decisions provide any analysis of why the PP
applies in that particular case (but not others),
and why the PP requires the result reached in
that speciﬁc case. Rather than articulating the
meaning and applicability of the PP, those
decisions generally simply cite the PP to tip
the balance in favor of the more protective
action under consideration. Likewise, there
are few decisions that discuss the PP in any
depth and then conclude it should not apply
(Commission of the European Communities
v. French Republic 2001). Rather, what we
have is a set of decisions, some of which
deploy the PP as a trump card that deter-
mines the outcome, and others that make no
mention of the PP. No criteria have been
articulated by any agency or court that deﬁne
when and when not the principle applies, and
what it requires when it does apply. This
empirical record certainly suggests the appear-
ance, if not the reality, of resilient arbitrariness
in the application and requirements of the PP.
To take a concrete example, the EU and
some other nations have restricted GM foods
based on the PP, an application strongly
advocated by many supporters of organic
foods. Yet, why is the PP being applied to
GM foods but not organic foods? Various
health and environmental risks have been
hypothesized for GM foods, although to date
no harm to human health or the environment
have been demonstrated. Although signiﬁcant
uncertainties remain about GM foods, many
safety tests have been conducted for each
commercialized GM product. In contrast,
there are known cases of human injury from
organic foods, including contaminated
organic lettuce, alfalfa sprouts, and apple juice
(Belluck and Drew 1998). Other health and
environmental risks from organic foods have
been suggested, including cancer risks from
increased mycotoxins in insect-damaged
organic vegetables, toxicity from natural pesti-
cides used on organic crops, and infections of
Escherichia coli 0157 from the use of manure
in organic farming (Leblanc et al. 2002;
Trewavas 2001). Unlike GM foods, organic
foods have generally not been subjected to
any safety tests (Tierney 2000). Although
substantial uncertainties exist about the risks
hypothesized for both GM and organic foods,
it would seem that the case for applying the
PP is stronger for organic foods than GM
foods. Organic foods have produced known
injuries and have been tested less than GM
foods, yet the PP is being used to restrict GM
foods but not organic foods. There may be
sound reasons for applying the PP to GM
foods but not organic foods, but such reasons
have yet to be articulated. In the absence of
such criteria, the application of the PP
appears to be governed primarily by arbitrary
decisions based on individual and group
self-interests and biases (Morris 2000).
Progression from General
Policy to Legal Rule
Some proponents of the PP defend against its
ambiguity by arguing that the principle is not
intended to provide a legal decision-making
rule but rather provides only a general guid-
ing policy that must be implemented through
other means (Barrett and Raffensperger 2002;
von Moltke 1996). The objections to the PP
would be much more subdued if the principle
were indeed conﬁned to such a general policy
role. Other commentators, however, argue
that the PP will achieve its purpose only if it
is applied as legal binding rule (Gullett 2000;
Stein 2000). 
The position that the PP must be applied
as a legal rule is in the ascendancy, as the PP
has evolved from a general policy preference
to a legal instrument in every jurisdiction in
which it has been adopted. In Europe and
elsewhere, regulators and reviewing courts ini-
tially applied the PP cautiously, referring to
the PP as at most supplementary support for a
decision that was made and defended on
other grounds. Over time, however, agencies
and courts have gradually grown bolder in
their use of the PP, and it is not uncommon
for the PP to be outcome determinative for
regulatory decisions that would likely have
been decided differently in the absence of the
PP (Leatch v. National Parks 1993; Pfizer
Animal Health SA v. Council 2002). In other
words, by mandating particular results, the
PP is now being applied as an obligatory legal
rule in the various jurisdictions that have
adopted it, including Australia (Gullett
2000), New Zealand (Stein 2000), India
(Razzaque 2002), Germany (de Sadeleer
2000), France (de Sadeleer 2000), and
Belgium (Larmuseau 2000).
Just as national governments and courts
are now applying the PP as a legal rule in
their domestic regulatory system, so too do
the most recent international environmental
agreements treat the PP as a binding legal
instrument. Whereas earlier international
environmental agreements included the PP
only in their preambles, more recent agree-
ments such as the Cartagena Biosafety
Protocol and the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants include the PP
as an operational requirement in the main
body of the treaty text (Marchant 2002).
Some international legal theorists argue that
the PP has crystallized into a binding norm
of customary international law as a result of
its frequent inclusion in international envi-
ronmental agreements and national regula-
tory decisions (Cameron and Abouchar
1996; McIntyre and Mosedale 1997).
Indeed, the European Commission asserts
that the PP is a “full-fledged and general
principle of international law” (European
Commission 2000). 
Applying a concept as vague as the PP as a
legal requirement creates two types of prob-
lems. First, it creates the opportunity for arbi-
trary and unpredictable decisions by agencies
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for courts to perform their responsibility to
ensure the reasonableness of agency decisions.
Arbitrary and unpredictable decisions. The
vagueness of the PP invites arbitrary or ques-
tionable decisions by regulatory agencies and
courts. In the absence of any clear criteria gov-
erning the application or meaning of the PP, it
can potentially be deployed as an outcome-
determinative wild card at any time. Not sur-
prisingly, it has produced some dubious
outcomes that otherwise likely could not be
justified. For example, the EU retroactively
applied the PP to ban the import of North
American beef from animals treated with
hormones, even though its own scientific
committees and subsequent World Trade
Organization (WTO) arbitration panels found
no scientiﬁc rationale for such a ban (Goldstein
2000; WTO 1998). The government of
Norway recently invoked the PP to ban
Kellogg’s Corn Flakes fortiﬁed with vitamins
because “the fortiﬁcation in question might be
a health hazard when eaten in uncontrollable
and unforeseen amounts,” although that deci-
sion was subsequently overturned by the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
court as an unjustiﬁed restraint of trade (EFTA
Surveillance Authority v. Norway 2001).
Zambia expressly cited the PP as the basis for
its recent decision to reject food aid from the
United States that contained GM corn kernels,
even though the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization concluded that the
decision would leave 2.9 million citizens at risk
of starvation (Bohannon 2002).
Courts too can use the PP to reach
questionable results. One such example may
be the decision of an Australian court to pro-
hibit, based on the PP, a town from building
a much-needed bridge because of its potential
effect on the endangered Giant Burrowing
Frog (Leatch v. National Parks 1993). The
problem was that the Giant Burrowing Frog
had never been seen anywhere near the pro-
posed bridge, having only been observed sev-
eral kilometers away on two occasions some
20 years earlier and on another occasion was
allegedly heard near the bridge site. Applying
a similar standard in the United States would
make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to site most federal projects under the
U.S. Endangered Species Act, which requires
listing of endangered species to be based on
objective scientific findings (National
Research Council 1995). 
Lack of meaningful judicial review. Louis
L. Jaffe, one of the fathers of modern adminis-
trative law, once wrote that the availability of
meaningful judicial review of regulatory agency
decisions “is the necessary condition, psycho-
logically if not logically, of a system of adminis-
trative power which purports to be legitimate,
or legally valid” (Jaffe 1965). Regulatory
decisions made pursuant to the PP will make it
difﬁcult for courts to provide meaningful judi-
cial review, given the almost unlimited discre-
tion provided by the ambiguity and
indeterminacy of the PP discussed above.
Several courts have already expressed
concern about treating the PP as a legal
instrument. An Australian court, when asked
to apply the PP, rejoined that “the statement
of the precautionary principle, while it may
be framed appropriately for the purpose of a
political aspiration, its implementation as a
legal standard could have the potential to cre-
ate interminable forensic argument. Taken
literally in practice it might prove to be
unworkable” (Nicholls v. Director 1994). A
British court, after noting “the absence of any
definition of the precautionary principle,”
found “quite remarkable the proposition that
each state should be obliged to act alone on
the basis of so general a statement of objec-
tives and considerations” (R. v. Secretary of
State 1994). 
An EU court recently opined that
“judicial review of the PP must be exercised
with caution,” in that courts can “only exer-
cise minimal review” of decisions based on
the PP given the “broad discretion” the PP
gives to political authorities (National
Farmers’ Union v. Secretariat 2002). The
court continued that
the precautionary principle has a future only to
the extent that, far from opening the door wide to
irrationality, it establishes itself as an aspect of the
rational management of risks, designed not to
achieve a zero risk, which everything suggests does
not exist. . . . 
Australian Justice Paul Stein, one of the
leading advocates of applying the PP as a rule
of law, nevertheless cautioned that the
principle
. . . will fade as a principle of international envi-
ronmental law unless given the teeth to enable it
to be applied in the reality of a world environment
subject to assaults on all sides. To achieve this,
generalized and sometimes vague principles need
to be refined and defined to avoid ambiguities,
inconsistencies, and, dare I say it, uncertainties.
(Stein 2000) 
Given “the absence of legislative guidance,”
Justice Stein argues that “courts have an
obligation to attempt to spell out the scope
and application of the PP.” In other words,
reviewing courts may be forced to go beyond
their traditional role of interpreting and
enforcing the law and themselves take on the
job of giving some substance to the PP.
The Future of Precaution
The PP is too vague and underspecified to
serve as a legally binding decision-making
rule. Yet, in every jurisdiction in which the
PP has been enacted, it is increasingly assum-
ing the status of a binding legal rule. Applying
the PP in this mode will result in real and
perceived arbitrariness. Over the long run, the
inevitable inconsistencies and unfairness that
will result from the application of such a
vague legal principle will result in growing
dissatisfaction with the PP in its current form.
As one legal commentator recently observed,
the PP, both as conceived and as applied, is
already in “disarray” (Stone 2001).
What is to be done? One option would be
to abandon the PP altogether. This might
result in a wasted opportunity to try to deﬁne
a coherent and explicit legal framework for
the application of precaution. The application
of precaution is not new, but the PP is chal-
lenging us to deal explicitly with how we
should apply precaution. It would be regret-
table if we simply retreated to implicitly
applying precaution as in the past. 
Another option would be to limit the PP
to a general policy objective rather than a
legal decision-making instrument. As such,
the PP would express a general objective of an
agency, nation, or treaty but would not have a
direct application to any specific regulatory
decision. Unfortunately, the history of the PP
suggests that such limits are unstable. Some
actors will always be tempted to push to give
the principle greater decision-making weight
in speciﬁc circumstances, and the precedents
established by these decisions will create a
one-way ratchet toward greater legalization.
Yet another possibility would be to
continue to apply the PP in its current vague
form and hope that repeated application of
the PP will eventually lead to the develop-
ment of some consistent criteria for its appli-
cation (Barrett and Raffensperger 2002). If a
central premise of the PP is that uncertainty
about risk is an inadequate reason to delay
regulation, some PP proponents may likewise
argue that uncertainty about the meaning of
the PP is an inadequate reason for delaying its
implementation. Such a strategy, however,
risks many years of arbitrary and unfair regu-
latory decisions. Moreover, it is not clear that
any consensus would ever develop on the
meaning of the PP, given the fundamental
disputes that exist today about the meaning of
the PP and the diversity of risk scenarios to
which it is being applied (Stone 2001). It may
therefore be unrealistic to expect a consensus
on the meaning of the PP to arise sponta-
neously through the experience of applying
the principle. Rather, any progress toward
agreement would likely come only through a
deliberate and concerted effort to better
deﬁne the PP.
This leads to the ﬁnal policy option, which
is to try to better deﬁne the appropriate applica-
tion of precaution. In particular, it would be
useful to deﬁne what factors argue for more or
less precaution for a specific risk, given that
some degree of precaution will be appropriate
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might affect the appropriate level of precaution
may include irreversibility (itself not a simple
concept to deﬁne coherently), the magnitude of
possible consequences, the probability of occur-
rence, the amount and types of uncertainty
associated with the risk, the societal beneﬁts of
the risk-creating activity, the difﬁculty and costs
of reducing the risk, potential alternatives to the
risk-creating activity, potential risk–risk trade-
offs, and public perceptions of the risk. It will
not be easy to reach agreement on how these
factors should be weighed in determining the
appropriate level of precaution in speciﬁc cir-
cumstances, given that many of these same
issues have been debated without resolution in
other contexts for decades. Nevertheless,
addressing these issues explicitly will provide a
more transparent and productive discourse on
how we apply precaution than hoping we can
somehow resolve these difﬁcult issues with the
alluring but ultimately contentless phrase “pre-
cautionary principle.” In the end, the most
important and lasting legacy of the PP may be
to focus the policy spotlight on the need to
explicitly define the appropriate role of
precaution in environmental decision making.
REFERENCES
Applegate J. 2000. The precautionary preference: an American
perspective on the precautionary principle. Hum Ecol Risk
Assess 6:413–443.
Barrett K, Raffensperger C. 2002. From principle to action: apply-
ing the precautionary principle to agricultural biotechnology.
Int J Biotech 4:4–17.
Belluck P, Drew C. 1998. Tracing bout of illness to small lettuce
farm. New York Times (New York, NY) 5 January: A1.
Bodansky D. 1991. Scientiﬁc uncertainty and the precautionary
principle. Environment 4–5 September: 43.
———. 1994. The precautionary principle in US environmental
law. In: Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (O’Riordan
T, Cameron J, eds). London:Earthscan Publications, 203–228.
Boehmer-Christiansen S. 1994. The precautionary principle in
Germany: enabling government. In: Interpreting the
Precautionary Principle (O’Riordan T, Cameron J, eds).
London:Earthscan Publications, 31–60.
Bohannon J. 2002. Zambia rejects GM corn on scientists’ advice.
Science 298:1153–1154.
Cameron J, Abouchar J. 1996. The status of the precautionary
principle in international law. In: The Precautionary Principle
and International Law (Freestone D, Hey E, eds). The
Hague:Netherlands:Kluwer Law International, 29–52.
Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic.
2001. Case No. C-1/00, European Court of Justice,
Luxembourg. 
Cross FB. 1996. Paradoxical perils of the precautionary princi-
ple. Washington Lee Law Rev 53:851–925.
de Sadeleer N. 2000. The enforcement of the precautionary
principle by German, French and Belgian courts. RECIEL
9:144–151.
Dovers SR, Handmer JW. 1995. Ignorance, the precautionary
principle, and sustainability. Ambio 24:92–97.
EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Norway. 2001. Case E-3/00,
2 C.M.L.R. 47, European Free Trade Association Court,
Luxembourg.
Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1976. Case
no. 73-2205, 541 F.2d 1, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, Washington, DC.
European Commission. 2000. Communication for the Commission
on the Precautionary Principle, COM(2000)1, 02.02.2000,
Brussels, Belgium.
Geistfeld M. 2001. Reconciling cost-beneﬁt analysis with the prin-
ciple that safety matters more than money. NYU Law Rev
76:114–189.
Goldstein BD. 1999. The precautionary principle and scientific
research are not antithetical. Environ Health Perspect
107:A594–595.
———. 2000. Use and abuse of the precautionary principle. Risk
Policy Rep March:39–40.
Graham JD, Wiener JB. 1995. Risk vs. Risk. Cambridge,
MA:Harvard University Press.
Gullett W. 2000. The precautionary principle in Australia: policy,
law and potential precautionary EIAs. Risk: Health Safety
Environ 11:93–124.
Hansson SO. 1997. Can we reverse the burden of proof? Toxicol
Lett 90:223–228.
Harremoës P, Gee D, MacGarvin M, Stirling A, Keys J, Wynne B,
et al., eds. 2002. The Precautionary Principle in the 20th
Century: Late Lessons from Early Warnings. London:
Earthscan Publications.
Hoffmann-Riem H, Wynne B. 2002. In risk assessment, one has to
admit ignorance [Letter]. Nature 416:123.
Jaffe LL. 1965. Judicial Control of Administrative Action.
Boston:Little Brown.
Larmuseau I. 2000. The precautionary principle introduced in
Belgian jurisprudence: the need for consistency. Eur Environ
Law Rev 2000:40–47.
Leatch v. National Parks and Wildlife Service and Shoalhaven
City Council. 1993. Case No. 10376. 81 LGERA 270. Land and
Environment Court of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.
Leblanc JC, Malmauret L, Delobel D, Verger P. 2002. Simulation of
the exposure to deoxynivalenol of French consumers of
organic and conventional foodstuffs. Regul Toxicol
Pharmacol 36:149–154.
Madsen KM, Hviid A, Vestergaard M, Schendel D, Wohlfahrt J,
Thorsen P, et al. 2002. A population-based study of measles,
mumps, and rubella vaccination and autism. N Engl J Med
347:1477–1482.
Marchant G. 2002. Biotechnology and the precautionary princi-
ple: right question, wrong answer. Int J Biotech 4:34–45.
McIntyre O, Mosedale T. 1997. The precautionary principle as a
norm of customary international law. J Environ Law
9:221–241.
Morris J. 2000. Defining the precautionary principle. In:
Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle (Morris J,
ed). Oxford:Butterworth-Heinemann, 1–21.
Mossman KL, Marchant GE. 2002. The precautionary principle
and radiation protection. Risk: Health Safety Environ
13:137–149.
National Farmers’ Union v. Secretariat General du Gouvernement.
2002. Case No. C-241/01, Opinion of Advocate General
Mischo, Luxembourg.
National Research Council. 1995. Science and the Endangered
Species Act. Washington, DC:National Academy Press.
Nicholls v. Director, General Parks and Wildlife Service. 1994.
Case No. 10151, NSWLEC 155, Land and Environment Court
of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.
Page T. 1978. A generic view of toxic chemicals and similar risks.
Ecology Law Quarterly 7:207–244.
Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council. 2002. Case No. T-13/99,
European Court of First Instance, Luxembourg. 
R. v. Secretary of State for Trade & Industry, ex parte Duddridge.
1994. Case No. 1995 Env L R 151, Queen’s Bench Division,
London, UK.
Raffensperger C, Tickner J eds. 1999. Protecting Public Health
and the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary
Principle. Washington, DC:Island Press.
Razzaque J. 2002. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh: Human rights and
the environment—national experiences. Environ Policy Law
32:99–111.
Sandin P. 1999. Dimensions of the precautionary principle. Hum
Ecol Risk Assess 5:889–907.
Santillo D, Stringer RL, Johnston, PA, Tickner J. 1998. The precau-
tionary principle: protecting against failures of scientific
method and risk assessment. Marine Poll Bull 12:939–950.
Stein P. 2000. A cautious application of the precautionary princi-
ple. Environ Law Rev. 4:1–10.
Stewart RB. 2002. Environmental regulatory decisionmaking
under uncertainty. Res Law Econ 20:71–135.
Stone CD. 2001. Is there a precautionary principle? Environ Law
Rep 31:10790–10799.
Tierney J. 2000. Is food safe just because it’s organic. New York
Times (New York, NY) 25 August: B1.
Trewavas A. 2001. Urban myths of organic farming. Nature
410:409–410.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
1992. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1.
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (U.S. FDA)/U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA). 2000. A U.S. Government Submission to
the Committee on General Principles of the Codex
Alimentarius Commission (March 22). Available:
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/codex/confpaper.htm
[accessed 24 March 2003].
von Moltke K. 1996. The relationship between policy, science,
technology, economics and law in the implementation of the
precautionary principle. In: The Precautionary Principle and
International Law (Freestone D, Hey E, eds). The Hague:
Netherlands:Kluwer Law International, 97–108. 
Wiener JB, Rogers MD. (2002). Comparing precaution in the U.S.
and Europe. J Risk Res 5:317–349.
Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle 1998.
Available: http://www.sehn.org/state.html [accessed 24
March 2003].
WTO. 1998. Case No. AB-1997-4, Report of Appellate Body,
January 16, 1998. Geneva, Switzerland:World Trade
Organization.
Mini-Monograph | Precautionary principle aspirations and limitations
Environmental Health Perspectives • VOLUME 111 | NUMBER 14 | November 2003 1803